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Althou9h c:onv"ntional wisdom sU99"sts that OPEC is a c:artel,
many studies sinc:e 1973 hav" c:onsider"d other underlyin9 forc:es
in order to understand and forec:ast OPEC b"havior Usin9 the
most gen"ral model to dat" on quart"rly data fr~m 1971:1 to
1986:IV we ec:onometric:ally test a vari"ty of h"poth"ses. We find
that th" various OPEC c:ountries behav" in quite dissimi lar ways
SU99"stin9 that a c:artel hypothesis is not appropriate. Under
our specification there was no evidence tor dynamic optimization
Or a stron9 target revenue model. There was some "videnc:" that a
form of tar9"t r"v"nue may be inc:luded in th" 90als fOr Iran,
Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Iraqi b"havior was most
consistent with a static competitive market structure, whi Ie a
static noncompetitive market structure was not rejected tor
AJgeria, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and V"nezuela. How"v"r
9iven their divergence in behavior we do not conclude In favor of
a w"ak c:art,,1 but that ther" is a nonc:omp"titive c:ore of SWin9
produc:ers that eac:h swin9 to their own rhythm.OPEC market stru~ture has been a SOur~e ot ~onsiderabie
debate sin~e 1973/74 when large prl~e In~reases ~atapulted OPEC
into pubJ ic attention. The debate ~ontinued with even larger
prl~e In~reaSes in 1978/79 but subsided In urgen~y with pri~es
tailing ba~k ~Ioser to historical levels In 1986. Conventional
wisdom suggests that OPEC is a cartel Or at least a weakly
functIoning cartel, gropIng towards an optimal level ot revenue
with recent price decreases signaling that the cartel is losing
its grip On the market.
The cartel argument, however, IS not universally held. 1 A
variety ot arguments have been put tOrth to try to explain OPEC
behavior. Since simulations ot OPEC as a cartel or a monopoly
did not simulate the high pri~es ot the 1980's, some modelers
explained continuing hi9h prIces with political arguments,
changing OPEL~ehavior, Or changing OPEC perceptions.
Competitive arguments suggest that market torces led to high
prices and then to lower prices. Property rights arguments
suggest that they resulted trom shitting property rights trom the
companies with a higher discount rate to OPEC countries with a
lower discount rate. A ccmpet j t j ve target revenue modeI, wh i ch
yields backward bending supply curves Once target revenue has
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(1979), Gately (19B4 andbeen attained, sU9gests that higher prices lead to lower OPEC
output.
Griffin (1985) is the first paper to systematically test
OPEC market structure across competing hypotheses.
quarterly data from 1971 to 1982 he estimates ~ simple static
econometric models that represent tour competin9 theories of OPEC
behavior --l3 cartel model, a competitive model, a target revenue'
model, and a property ri9hts model - and concludes in favor ot a
market sharin9 cartel model for OPEC. Sa I eh i-Isfahan i (1987)
usin9 Griffin's data and model allows for expectations with a
la9ged price and concludes in favor of a target revenue model
Ne i ther ot these stud i es cons i dered the imp I i cat ions of
dynamic optimization on their tests and both tested their
hypotheses one at a time. We bu i I d upon the i r framework and
extend their··--trork by explicitly considerin9 a dynamic model and
the imp I i cat ions that dynam i c behav i Or wou I d have ·on the
competin9 hypotheses. Providin9 a stron9 theoretical base allows
uS to test directly rather than assume whether static or dynamiC
behavior is mOre appropriate.
by bu i I d i n9 a modelin wh i ch a I
We increase the power 0+ our tests
hypotheses are nested in one
equation rather than testing each hypothesis separately as has
been done earl ier. We use this more general model to first test
whether each country In OPEC IS characterized better by a static
or a dynamic model. We use the results of these tests to test
the ear I i er hypotheses: whether property ri9hts models with
lower discount rates tor OPEC than tor the multinational 0,1
companies are appropriate tor explaining OPEC behavior, whet~e"
there is evidence for noncompetitive behavior, and whether t~~~~:
zrevenue appears to be the primary goal for any of the OPEC
countries. We also do tormal testing a~rOSS the various OPEC
countries to see it they have the same economic soals and the
same I ags In behav i Or.
-,Data I imitations pre~luded either ot these studies trom
in~luding ~ost in their _model. Re~ently available ~ost
intormation allowed uS to in~lude this important variable tor a
more complete model specification. Econometr i c advances I nc I ude
testing tor serial correlation and correcting tor it where
appropriate, testing tOr simultaneity using a Sims' test and
estimating using 2 stage seemingly unrelated regressions where
appropriate, and paying somewhat more attention to creating
quarter Iy trom annual data. We, 0+ course, include mOre recent
data than the""or Igina I stud ies, wh i ~h a I lows est Imat Ion over
periods at dramatic: price increases as wei I as mere recent price
decl"'eases.
I. Model
For a producer of a nonrenewable reSOurce economic theory
sugest a dynami~ optimization model. Since assuming such a
Hotel I ing type of behavior does not pre~lude stati~ behavior,
hypothes i zing such a mode I a I lows uS to test both stat j ~ and
dynaml~ behavior within this single tramework. We start with
produce~s maximjzjn9 the p~~s~nt value of profits from exports
ov~~ a finite time horizon.
T
MaxJ[f(y,q)q - C1 (R)q - CZ(wl]e-rt dt
o
3subjec:t to
where f is the demand func:tion, Y is Inc:ome, q is output, C1 the
c:ost of produc:t i On, R the I eve I of reserveS, Cz the c:ost of
exploration, w the level of exploratory effort, X the Sum of all
disc:overies to date, and G the disc:overies func:tion. The
Hamiltonian tor this p'roblem IS
The first D~der conditions are:
Hw = C -rt + Gw(¢l + ¢z) = D - Zwe
.~....- • C1Rqe-rt ¢1 = -HR =
A Ithough we cannot obta in an ex~lie i t express i on tor q, ane can
see t rom the above t irst order cend l t ions that an imp lie i t
func:tion of q would be
wh i c:h we approx i mate with the fo I low i n'3 mode I . The quantity or
oi exported is c:alc:ulated to be a func:tion of the demand for
011 J the costs at extraction and exploration, the interest rate·
and the I eve I ot reserveS equa I to in i t i a I reserves p I uS nelJJ
discDveries minus extraction.
demand minus non OPEC supply,
Demand for OPEC 0iiis wOr Id
1n Our mode I, PI'" ice and Income
wi I I represent the world demand tunction. Sinc:e nOn OPEC s~~~
is heav i I y dependent on pI'" ice, pI'" tee and income may represE'1"" ~ '3
4reduced form for OPEC demand. We wi I I a I so add nonOPEC
production directly alons with price 3nd Income to test if "
adds any information to the estimation. The number ot we I Is
dr I I I ed represents exp I orat i On. The Intercept picks up the
effect ot the Initial level of reser"ves. ExplorationJ
development, and I ittlns costs are entered directly. Since ,he
inclusion ot extra variables does not bias parameter estimates we
also include inves,ment In tixed capital tormatlon to test the
target revenue hypothesis. Our model is:
Ln OOIL = So + Sp Ln POlL + Sq Ln Ow + Sw Ln WELLS
+ Sr r t Sy Ln GOP t Sl Ln lnv t Sc Ln COST (1)
Where OOIL = 0 I I exported.
POlL = current and/or I assed rea I pr ices ot 0 i I .
Ow = CUrrent and/or I assed non-OPEC tree wor I d 0 i I
production.
WELLS = current and/or I assed we I Is dr i I led.
r = current and/or lassed the In,erest rate.
GOP = current and/or lassed i'ndi:::es of sross domestic'
product of buyers ot OPEC 01 I.
lnv = current and/or I assed Investment in sross t I xed
cap I,a I used as the tarset revenue.
COST = a five year runnlns averase ot extraction and
exploration costs per barrel.
We wi I I besln with curren, values ot al var i ab I es but w' I I
also conduct a wide array ot lag testin9 to determine what 50rtS
1Ii 't.a j" e s 1:. j" d t E::' ~ ,
already In percentage torm are entered directly, All ochervariabl~s ar~ ~ntered as logs and ~ence th~lr cD~ttlCtents ar~
elasticities.
II Data and Estimation Technique
This model IS estimated an quarterly data fnr 1971' tn
1986'IV Inr the cnuntries where all data are available - Algeria,
Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela; 71: to
85'IV fnr Iran; 71,1 tn 82'IV fnr Iraq and Libya; and 72'1 tn
86' IV Inr UAE. Gabnn, Qatar, and Ecuadnr with tnn much misSing
data are left nut nf the analysIs. The price at oi I in dollars)
supplied by Griffin, is updated by the OPEC Annual Statistlcai
Bulletin and the Mnnthly Energy Review. While Griffin used OPEC
production data, we use export data because domestic pricing and
consumption, which are isolated tram world markets in many of
these countr.j~.s, may be respond i ng to po lit i ca I goa j s. Our
expnrt data is acquired by adjusting Griffin's data thrnugh 1982
and updating tram monthly observations at oi I exports from the
Q.cJ... and Gas Jnurnal. Wells dri lied are nnt avai lable an a
~uarterly basis but are created by i.nterpolations using quarterly
exploration data on rig counts. The proxy tor the interest rate
tac I ng OPEC I s the rea I rate nf return nn U.S. treasury b I I : s'
and the proxy tor GOP fnr buyers of OPEC crude 0 Ilis an 'I ndex n t
real GOP for the industrial world Irnm the IMF. Investment
numbers, only available On an annual baSIS trom the IMF, are
made into ~uarterly data by Interpolations based on a one year
lag on 0 i I revenues. A one year lag is used since regreSs)c~S
experimenting with annual lags uP to three years suggests that t
prnvldes the best fit. ~r'lce 1r1 U.S. dollars is detlatea '-the U.S. GOP deflatoc base yeac 1982. Investment IS canvert.ec
U. S. do I I acs by the exchan'3e cat,. and th,.n def Iated by the U.S.
fixed Investment deflator base vear 1982. Cost IS taken from
Adelman and Shahi (1989). Given the random vartatlQn In costs
that occurS trom year to year for each year we took a moving
averagE' of the preVIOUS five years costs and Interpolated to make
It quarterly.
We estimate and test using seemingly unrelated regressions
unless otherwise specified. Given the difficulty In programml~g
with differing sample sizes, we estimate on 4 sample sizes 71
AI I COuntr i es
with sufficient data are included In each of the runS. The "tests
eire done on the longest saml=lle In which the country IS IncluCleCl.
In the initial estimates the Durbin Watson statistic suggested .-
tirst order serial correlation was a problem to~ al I but Iraq,
which would lead to biased and Inconsistent estimates of the
varIance covariance mat~ix. To Obtain consistent estimates t~e
data was adjusted by a cho. which was estimated uSln'3 a
Hi Idreth-Lu search proceduce for each el:fuation. FurtherJ some
the OPEC exportecs have si'3nificant market shaces.
exports i nf I uenc:e the pr i c:e ot 0 ii, 0 i I pI'" i ce endogene i ty WI
bias estimates. A Sims'(19721 exo'3eneitv t,.st on ,.ach ,.quatc-
rejected the hypothesis that the pr,c" of 01 was !?x0genOus "'::,
IranI Kuwait, the UAE, and \Jene'zue)a. 1 For these countrIes ~~
I.Thls test was conducted by Including a future Jag on prlC~
the equation. The nul I h~pothes's s rejected for each c:o~~·
where the coeffIcient on the tutwre ia9 is significantly
dl tferent trOm zero,instrumental variable was substituted tor the price of oi 1 by
regressing the price of oi I on lags at the other variables.
III HypothesIs Testing
Table 1 shows a wide variation In reserves, production,
costs, and absorption capacity tor OPEC economies.
iable 1: Variables representing OPECJs productIon capacity, costs, absorptive






RIP DEPTH NUMBER 1000 I WELL
in yr teet WELLS bid bid
1987 1986 1987 1987 1987
EXPOrts
Average Range
ARTIF POP. PER CAP. 1000 1000
LIFT 1000 GOP 101d !ofd
1986 1986 1986 US$ 71'1-86'~
===================================================================================
Algeria 8500 35.9~ 856S 8~0 6~8 771.~3 205 21720 2566 631 958
Ecuador 1615 28.18 78~8 922 157 170.28 802 9650 1153
Indonesia 84.00 19.4.0 4.501 577 1186 205.4.0 514. 16694.0 4.51 959 799
1ran 92850 108.62 774.3 361 234.2 64.87.53 0 ~4.21o 3362 3113 5355
Iraq 100000 130.71 NA 615 2096 34.08.13 NA 11120 1225 1618 3036
Kuwait 91920 229.78 3717 363 1096 3019.28 20 1790 9556 1538 2702
Libya 21000 56.4.1 1230 661 1020 154.3.12 NA 3600 5514. 1587 2574.
Nigeria 15980 35.34 NA 125 1239 988.83 NA 98520 374 1593 1719
Qatar 3150 30.39 7750 174. 284 1632.18 2 330 15000 420 388
5audi A 166980-'12.85 5870 5BB 4054 6894.56 NA 1154.0 64.46 6347 7769
UAE 96605 194.47 86BB 680 1361 2001.4.7 223 1380 1545 145Ll 1351
VenezueI a56300 96.89 NA 979 1592 162.50 851 17320 2808 1402 1809
===================================================================================
Data Detinitions' bid = barrels per day, mb = ml II ions ot barrels, yr = years.
There are approximately 7.4 barrels per metric ton at 01 i.
Sources: Qll and Gas Journal, Dec. 1987
Opec Annua I Stat1sticaI Bu IIet In,
International Financial Statistic
Despite these dltterences, it OPEC is strictly a cartel Wit'"
some sort of market shar i ng scheme Or it countr i es have S I mI! 21r
market structures, we might expect simi lar estimated coefticients
acrOSS countries. Our first three hypotheses are to forma I: v
test thiS conjecture for OPEC and tor two cores of producers
using equation 1 and current values of all variables.
Hypothesis l' All OPEC Countr les share a Similar market
structure and have similar ::oettlc entS.
a
Let and j repri?5e n ta I I OPEC countries, th.. n
H , I3pi = I3 pj to, a I I ''''J 0
I3 w1 = I3 wj
13'li = 13'lJ
13,; = l3,j
l3 yi = l3 y j
13 j i = I3jj
I3 c i = I3cJ
H1 ' I3 p ; # I3 p j to, a I I iloj
I3 w; # I3 wj
13'li # 13'lj
l3'i # l3,j
l3 y i # I3 YJ
13 j i # I3jJ
Sci
,~ I3 c j
Hypoth..sis 2. Sam.. as 1 but I .. t and J = Iran, lracl' Kuwait)
Saudi A,ab;a, and UAE.
Hypoth..s i s 3·-...· Sam.. as 1 but I ..t and j = I t'" an, 1raq, Kuwa j t J
Saudi A,abia, UAE, and V..n..:u.. la.
These th'ee hypoth..ses a,.. t ..st..d usin9 Chi S'lua,e tests.
Th.. sl9niticane.. levels ot thes.. t ..sts and al I subse'lu..nt
hypoth..ses t ..sts a,.. 9iven In Tabl .. 2. Since de9rees ot tr~edom
•
and test statistics vary, tor economy and clarity of expositionl
we report significance levels rather than the test statistic.
Sine.. all t ..stin9 is don.. at th.. 57. Si9nitieane.. lev.. l, any
significance level less than 5". results in a rejection of the
null hypothesis .Table 2: Signi t icance Levels tor a i I Hypothesis Tests
~ Ind lrn It:.s Kuw Lib lli..s Sau UAE Ven Nu I I Hypothes I s
HI 0% 07. LJ% 3% 0% 07. 0% 07. 07. 0% All OPEC Same
H2 07. 1r. 07. 0% 0% (5) MidEast Same
H3 07. 0% 07. 07. 0% 0% Core (6) Same
H4 997. 100% 217. 99% 1007. 887. 1007. 94% 100% 947. NonDynamic
H5 0% 267. 47% 377. 15% 40% 587. 717. 247. 647. No Property rights
H6 1007. 887. 100% 1% 8% 100% 17% 1007. 100% 100% OPEC Non Compl;ltitlve
H7 2"'. 21% 197. 3% 0% 6"0 07. 0% 89% 0% OPEC Non Monopoly
H8 07. 07. 0% 07. 0% 0% 07. 0% oro 0% Stron9 Target Rev
H9 07. 17. 46% 07. 07. 16% 07. 267. 0% 0% Weak Target Rev
AI I hypotheses that a I I countr ies Or a cOre ot
- countrie5 are simi lar are strongly rejected using current values
at all variables. Before proceeding to complete Our hypothesis
testIng we investigate whether current values or some lag
structure better explains these countries) behavior. To do so
separate regressions are run with lags from 0 to 20 tor each
variable except cost. The 10.9 len9th is chosen that minimizes
2-
the SchwarZ (1978) CriteriOn = (RSS + K 109(T) ~ )/T, where RSS
is the regression Sum of squares, K is the number of regressorS,
r is the estimated standard errOr ot the re9ression and T is the
number of observations. Cost IS not including in the testln9
because it IS a five year running average and already has lags
oui It into it. Table 3 containS the lag len9th chosen tor eac~
0+ the variables usin9 this procedure.
toTable 3, Lag Lengths Chosen by the Schwarz Criteria.
.E..Q.i..!.. !. We I Is GOP Inv Ow
Algeria 1 0 20 1 0 0
Indonesia 1 0 0 1 0 0
Iran 3 0 0 0 8 16
Iraq 8 9 0 0 9 8
KuwaIt 0 0 0 17 0 0
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 8
Nigeria 1 0 0 4 0 3
Saudi Arabia 0 0 20 0 0 20
UAE 0 0 0 4 0 0
Venezuela 3 12 8 12 4 0
The lag testing most often suggests that the I:urrent value
fits better than a distributed lag of the variable. Where lags
are appropr I a.tow" they vary cons j·der-ab I y acrOSS countries but are
generally 8 quarters or less. To further investigate lags In
behavior the lags resulting from the above testing are Included
in each equation and the model is reestimated to determine
whether lags added any information. Only those lags whose sum IS
significantly different from zero is retained in the model The
only lags that added information and were retained In the final
estimation results are those on income for Kuwait and the
Interest rate tel"" Iraq.
Finally, the coefficient on Non-OPEC free world praductlun
IS examIned to determine if it added any information to the
model Only tor Nigeria and Iraq IS Its coefficient
•
Significantly dittere'nt from :erO leadIng to its inclUSion 11""\ ~ .....
: IAlthOugh
prete~~ed results. These results, whIch are used tor al I
subsequent hypothesis testing, are given In Table 4. The +Irs:
row of numbers next to the sample years are the estimated
caeft i c ients wh i I e the second row of numbers are the t
statistiCS,
The R2 s Impl~ that between 36 and 94 percent ot the
variation In exports IS explained by these variables.
fOrmal tests did not find countrIes to have the same
coefficients, there are a number of qualitative similarities
acrOSS countries. The coefficient on wells IS always inelastiC
and most often positive. Thus, dr I I I I ng has tended to ta I I much
faster than exports suggesting excess capacity. The
Significantly negative coefficient for Nigeria and Iraq may
Suggest difficulty in maintaining exports since wells drilled
increased as ~~¢orts decreased.
As would be expected, the coefficient on cost _is most etten
negative, The coetticlent on the price ot 01 IS most otten
negat I ve, that On the f nterest rate is a I most a I ways negat I ve,
while that On investment IS always positive and One at the most
signifIcant variables. The implications of these coeffic:cnts;:;r
market structure are nOw examined formally,
The negative coefficient on the prIce of 01 could be
conSistent with dynamic optimizatiOn in a Hoteiling type 0+ WO~
With price riSlns and exports +aill~g over tim~, with a.
noncompetitive static world, Or With a target revenue goal Wh~~~
•
exports I"" Ise to make uP tor ta I
pass I b I I I ties W I I I be conS leer" '?d.
Each ot theseTable 4' Econometric Estimates ot Cf'EC Exports
AIgeria C Po I I Wells r Y Inv Cost OW rho OW R2
1971 198b 2.85 -0.27 0.33 -0.02 -1.62 0.62 -0.74 0.78 1.89 0.74
t stat 4.06 -3.38 7.48 -2.33 -2.39 12.79 -1.66 8.00
•
Indonesia C Po i I Wells r Y Inv Cost QW rho OW R2
1971 198b 3.28 -0.07 0.11 -0.02 -0.48 0.20 -0.18 0.61 2.29 0.36
t stat 5.21 -1. 17 3.70 -2.79 -1. 28 3.67 -2.09 5.65
Iran C Po I I Well s r Y Inv Cost QW rho OW R2
1971 1985 -1.18 -0.49 0.11 0.01 1.79 0.59 -2.42 0.68 1.82 0.80
t stat -0.54 -4.37 1.05 0.82 1. 31 11.55 -3.39 5.84
Iraq ( Po i I Wells r (L9) Y Inv (ost OW OW P:
1973 1982 -21.06 0.40 -0.54 -0.35 -3.77 0.70 -0.20 2.54 1.72 0.94
t stat -5.15 2.80 -7.70 -14.28 -2.40 17.49 -0.87 3.97
Kuwait ( Po I I We IIs r Y(Ll7) Inv Cost OW rho OW R2
1975 1986 13.56 0.09 0.01 -0.04 -4.84 0.55 0.25 0.45 1.88 0.Q3
t stat 14.39 1.43 0.31 -4.39 -13.90 14.88 3.16 1.89
Libya ( Po i I We II s r Y Inv (ost QW rho OW R2
1971 1982 -1.35 -0.62 -0.15 -0.01 2.56 0.47 -0.43 0.76 1.75 0.40
t stat -0.98 -5.19 -1.43 -1.17 1.96 7.86 -1.23 6.38
Nigeria ( -"15 0 I I Wells r Y Inv Cost QW rho OW R2
1971 1986 10.15 0.06 -0.13 -0.03 1.54 0.19 -0.30 -1.01 0.35 2.02 0.61
t stat 4.31 0.96 -3.53 -2.77 3.17 8.93 -2.37 -3.39 2.59
Saudi Arab ( Po i I Wells r Y lnv (ost OW rho OW "'"7 .. ~
1971 1986 3.96 -0.40 0.02 -0.01 -2.07 0.51 -0.16 0.78 1.91 0.54
t stat 7.51 -3.99 0.47 -1.56 -4.12 10.00 -0.81 8.80
UAE ( Po I I Wells r Y 'lnv (cst OW rho OW !;J--
",,"
1972 198b 3.23 -0.17 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.34 -0.31 0.55 1.68 0.6'9
t stat 3.13 -3.52 0.90 -2.75 0.15 8.25 -2.36 4.18
Venezuela ( Pei I Wells r Y lnv (cst OW rhe OW 0:
1971 1986 6.13 -0.36 0.17 -0.01 -0.84 0.18 0.37 0.41 1.80 C is
t stat 7.87 -5.23 3.68 -1.59 -3.20 3.90 1.01 3.08
A key test ot whether the model _is static or dynamic :5 ':-'0:>
• coefficient On the interest rate.
the I nterest rate WOU I d increasE' the va I we at a i I j n the bar""
over 011 in the ground and should inCrease output, while
decreasing it should decrease output. Thus Br ) 0 !S cons s:~-:
13with a dynamic model. In a static model the lntere'st rate IS
only a cost at production. An i ncr*eaS i n9 r*ate at intere'st wou I d
in~rease costs at production decreasing exports and yielding a
HypothesIs 4 IS that COuntries do not behave ,n a
dynamic manner verSUS the alternative that they do Or:
Hypothesis 4; Countries are dynamic or tor each OPEC ~ountry
for each
for each
SurprisinglYJ in no case can we reject the nul I hypothesIs
In favor of
1
the alternative that countries behave dynamically.'
However, both the countries and the companies have produced aver
the sample period with the control 0+ exports transferred over
time from the multinationals to OPEC. Property ownership •
ar9uments su~est that they mi9ht have different discount rates
The COmpan j es r j sk i n9 nat i onaIizat i On may have had a higher
interest rate than the countries social rate of interest.
Alternatively Adelman (1986) ar9ueS that countries whose
ecOnom ies are very dependent on an u'nstableo i I market shou I d
have had hi9her discount rates than the companies. In either
and
dat~
event J the use of One j nterest rate mj ght reSu Itin a fa i Iure to
detect dynamic behavior.
To test th i 5 conjecture we a I low separate discount rates ":::Jr
the companies and countries and retest to determine whether t~ey
1.These results supersede Our preliminary results in Dahl
(ucel(l988). After updatin9' checkln9> and correctin9 al
and transtormatlons and uSing a mOre complete and correct
spe~I+lcation, we no longer tlnd much evidence conSistent w!: .....
dynamic oPtimization.
14
•each display static 01"" dynamic: behavior and it their behavIor IS
We hypothes i ze that the soc: i a I rate ~l"" I 5 some percent
ot the private rate . Under this hYPothesis the rate ot interest
•
•
IS a weighted average ot the private and the social rate Or'
r = [r(l-G) + ~rG] (2)
Where Gis the percent ot OPEC output contro I I ed by the OPEC
countries Or the country participation rate and (l-G) is the
share controlled by the multinationals. Substituting this
expression into (1) gives us Our testing equatIon:
Ln QOIL = So + Sp Ln POlL + Sw Ln WELLS + Sr [r(l-G) + ~rG]
+ Sy Ln GOP + Sl Ln Inv + Sc Ln COST (3)
This equation al lows uS to test property rights arguments or
whether the countries and the multinationals behave the same
•
against the alternative that they behave di tterently or'
Hypothesis 5' Multinationals and OPEC countries have the same
discount rate Or tor each OPEC country
for each
tor each
Only for Algeria, where the coetticient for Algeria is
negat i ve and 5 Igoit icant wh i I e that tor the c:aml=!an ies IS I=!OS I t I VI?
and significant, do the multinationals and the country behave ,n
a dissimilar manner. Since the coettlcient tor Algeria is
signIficantly ne9ativel there IS sti I I no evidence that countries
dynamically ol=!timize.
arguments.
No!"" does this test support prOl=!erty r:9 h tS
• Given nO evidence for dynamic optimization we p!""oceed to
analyze the implications of behaVior in a static: f!""C1mework.
15For static behavior, we can further test market structure. 1n a
competitive world we know that price equals mar9inal cost and
would thus expect price and quantity to be directly related. Tne
nul I hypothesis af no competitive behavior is tested against thiS
alternative that the countries behave competitively'







Only for the case Iraq do we reject in favor of competitive
behavior. An upward sloping supply curve would be neCessary but
not necessarily sufficient tor competitive behavior. To further
test for market structure we investi9ate the impl ications of
monopoly beha¥jor.
1t OPEC countr i es are behav j n9 ina monopo Ii s-t i c manner, we
wou Id eXl=lect that income In i ndustr i a I j zed CDuntr i es and perhaps
NonOPEC supply would affect export patterns. Althou9h a supply
function may not exist tor the monopoly case, comparative statics
shows what the s i 9nS on P and Y mi 9ht be expected to be. Tota i I y
differentiatin9 the first order condition MR - MC = 0 9;ves'
( ~M RI [jQ - [jMCI [jQ l (0 t rom sec 0 nd 0 r de r cond i t ions, wh i I e
aMR/~L, eqUa Is:




Then ~P/ay is positive' (l-lIt'p) IS positive, and
(p8f-p 18 y )I';'2 is posit I ve un I e s s i}~p18 y i s nega t i ve 0 r
equivalently demand gets mOre elastic as it is shifted out .
Thus, since dQ/dy can be greater than zero Or less than zerO, we
will take significant coefficients On GOP of industrialized
countries as evidence at mono~oly behavior. To determine what
sign on the oi I price coefficient is conSistent with monopoly
behavior totally differentiate P to get:
dP = gp/aQ dQ + gP/dy dy Or dP/dQ = gp/aQ + aP/ay dy/dQ.
Since aP/aQ < zerO and ~P/8y > zero, a sufficient condition
for dP/dQ to be negative is a negative dQ/dy. In the mOre ikely
•
event that dQ/dy is positive, the sign of dP/dq IS ambiguous.
Thus, a negative significant coefficient on Y wi I I require a
negat i ve coe"f""·j c i ent on pr ice tor uS to cone I ude in favor of
monopoly.
The nul hypothesis is nO monopoly behavior against the
alternative at monopoly behavior.







We can see trom Table 2 that the candidates for monopoly
behaVior by testing Income are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria ..
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. However in rraq) the 5 j gn on I nc::Jme
•
1$ negative and Si9nificant and the sign on price is positive a~d
SignIficant which is inconSIstent with monopoly behavior.
Further, SInce export supply IS upward slopins and Iraqi exPOr:s
are POSitively COrrelated With mOre com~etitive NonOPEC sUPP'
17con~lude that IraqI behavior is more consistent with competitive
than monopoly behavior. Whether the ending of the war with Iran
changes Iraqi behavior to be more consistent with other Middle
Eastern Countries remains to be seen. Recent resolution of ~wota
problems suggests movements in that directiDn.
Investment is the last variable to be discussed. The
correlation between Dt I revenues and GOP per capita across the
cDuntries in Our sample in 1986 was over .90. Thus, 0 i I revenues
are a major source of total income as wel as ;nvestment income
leadin9 to the last hypothesis, the target revenue model. In the
strict form at this hypothesis let Inv* be the target revenue.
Then Inv* = QOIL-POIL or QOIL = Inv*/POIL. A 109 I inear
tormulation ot this hypothesis IS for the coetticient on POlL to
be -1 and that on Inv* to be + 1. •
Hypothesis 8: Target revenue stron9 Or for each OPEC country
Ho ' I3 p i=-1 and 13li" 1,
HI' I3 p i#-1 and 131;# 1
As can b.. s ..en in Tab I .. 2, th i s .hypothes iSIS stron91 y
r ..jected for al I countri ..s leadin9 uS to test a weak.. r form 0+
the hypothesis which is tor the coettici ..nts on POlL to be
ne9ative and that on Inv* to be equal and opposite in Si9n.
Hypothesis 9: Tar9.. t revenue weak Or for each OPEC country
H : o I3 p i=- 13 11
I3 p i#-l3j I
Three countries do not reject the weaker form of the
hypothesis - Iran, Libya, and Saud! Arabia. •
tests of the target revenue model are most otten rejected,
1d•
, .
investment is posItive and significant In every e~uation. In
most equations it is the most significant variable sU9gesting
that a significant portion of oj I export revenueS are earmarked
tor sroSS domesti~ ~apital tormation,
Indonesia and the UAE are the onl~ ~ountries not ~onslstent
with at least one ot the hypotheses tested, Both have shown the
least percentage variation in exports 0+ al I countries tested but
are extremes otherwise since Indonesia has the lowest reserve
over production ratio, less than 20 years, whi Ie th5' UAE has One
ot the hishest, over 190 ~ears. The t statisti~s sussest that
wells is the best forecaster tar Indonesian eXl=lorts, implYing
Itttle excess capacity . Investment is a I most as i mpOt'tant,
• a I thoush I n~nes I a had the sma I Iest and Ieast S i snit i ~ant
•
coefficient on investment of al the countries tested. Indones.3
a I so had the sma I I est percentage vat"' i at j on I n exports, thE? lowest
government I='artic:ij:'ation r"ate, and the smallest percent of
variation in exports explained by these economic variables.
For the UAE, investment is b~ far the best p~edlctor 01
eXPorts with price running second. This impol"'tanc:e of InveStment
•
and the fa~t that the ~oetti~lent on the pri~e ot 0; I and
Investments are opposite in sign suggest target revenues are
Important but not In as strong a torm as either hypotheSIS testec
here.
Our testing results have ImplicatIons on the hYPotheSIS ':-~':
Saudi Arabia or some cOre of countries act as swing produce-;
Since a swing producer would be noncompetitive, the candldat~~
+01'" sWing producer t,..om the ab8vl; analysis are Algeria, NI~eria
19·- .
Saudi ArabiaJ Kuwait, and V~nezuela. Further, we would expect
that a swing producer would show larger SWIngs In production Over
the sample. Examinln9 the eVidence In Table 1 we can see that
a I I t i ve have had large sw i ngs in exports as a percent at average
exports. lcan and lcaq have had lacge swin9s as wei I but they
may have been more war and revolution related since the testing
sU9gested competitive Or target revenues may be motivating their
behavioc.
As with any study of this natuce data quality and
mw It i co I I i near i ty present prob I ems. We have found ovec the
course 0+ the study that Our results are somewhat sensitive to
specification and urge the reader to view the present conclUSIons
fcom Our most·1:!"tjmplete specification In that li9ht.
lV Conclusions
•
So is OPEC a cartel? Althou9h a lot of uncertainty sti I I
surrounds OPEC decision making, Our econometric model developed
out of dynamic optimization sU9gests that various OPEC countcles
seem to behave in quite dissimi lsI"" ways. Hence a strict market
sharin9 cartel hypothesis is not appropriate. Nor did we find
any core of countries that had identical coefficients.
countries did not behave ike a strict cartel there is evidence
ot noncom~etitive behavior tal"" Algeria, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, and Vene:uela. ThiS noncom~etitive behavior coupled With
large swings in production but diSSimilar coefficients leads uS
to quaIi ty these countr i es as sw i ng produce'rs rather than as a
carte! .
We were disappointed to find I ittJe evidence at dynamic
optimizatIon using Either current or distributed lags 11n inter~s:
20. ,
rates. Althou9h such myopic behavior ml9ht wei I be qUite
rational in a highly uncertain environment. This econometric
•
work is consistent with the disappointin9 results obtained by
dynamic optimization models and SUPPorts efforts of modelers to
move away from them. In addition to not tindin9 eVidence tor
• dynamic behavior! la9 teStin9 sU9gested rather short la9s In
adjustment. For many variables current values were preferred and
only in two cases (la9ged interest rate in the Iraqi equation and
buyer Income in the Kuwa It i equat ion) did Ia9S add any
information to the estimation.
•
the short term nature of the decision process.
Not surprisingly, there IS little evidence that companies
dynamically optimized either' since the majority of the
mu It inat iona I product i on ; n these nat Ions was 9radua I I y
nationalized. Nor was the property ri9hts ar9ument supported.
• These IS evidence that some form of target revenues may be a
90al for Iran, Libya, and Saud; Arabia. However, although tormal
•
tests of the target revenue model Were rejected in the majority
of cases, forecasters should note that investment is sti I I an
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